ACCESS4ALL Group

The DRC’s 2022 oil‐and‐gas auction was a calculated political signal, not a genuine push for drilling. By offering 30 exploration blocks (covering ~800,000 km² of rainforest, peatlands and gorilla habitat) the government made clear that it could “bolster or undermine” climate goals depending on the funds it received. Officials openly stated that the auction’s aim was to “leverage the threat of environmental destruction” to extract international climate finance. In practice this meant highlighting the climate value of DRC’s forests and oil: the Congo basin contains the world’s second-largest rainforest (storing roughly 29 billion tons of carbon) and tens of billions of barrels of oil. By signaling that these carbon sinks could be lost without adequate support, DRC forced global attention on its climate vulnerability (it is one of the lowest emitters yet one of the most vulnerable countries) and made a stark case for compensatory funding.

Multilateral Coordination (REDD+, Coalitions and Blocs)

The DRC amplified its leverage by working through international coalitions. It joined forces with other tropical forest nations – notably Brazil and Indonesia – to form a “rainforest OPEC” holding over 50% of the world’s tropical forests. In this Brazil–Indonesia–DRC alliance, members agreed to push for pay-for-performance forest finance: they called for rich countries to pay for maintaining carbon sinks and struck a plan to negotiate new funding mechanisms, including expanded REDD+ support. At COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh the DRC and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations used this unity to win concrete gains. Together they secured language in the COP decision allowing developing countries to sell internationally‐vetted sovereign carbon credits under REDD+. This effectively made it more lucrative for DRC and its allies to protect forests rather than exploit them.

In parallel, the DRC engaged broader groupings of developing countries. It helped steer the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group and the African Union to present unified demands on finance, repeatedly linking environmental protection to economic development. For example, at an LDC preparatory meeting in Senegal Minister Bazaiba stressed that Africa cannot accept having its “vital interests ignored” when tackling climate change. By acting multilaterally, DRC and its partners gained bargaining power as a bloc – pressuring wealthier nations more effectively than as isolated appeals.

Loss and Damage in Strategy and Debate

“Loss and damage” (L&D) – the idea that rich emitters owe compensation for climate harms in poor countries – became a core part of DRC’s pitch. In COP27 pre‑meetings hosted by Kinshasa, the DRC’s environment minister explicitly framed the negotiations around L&D, insisting that “the richest…nations should take financial responsibility for their role in the climate crisis”. The oil auction itself dramatized this point: by threatening ecosystems that buffer climate change, DRC highlighted the potential economic and human costs if its climate vulnerabilities (it ranks highly among the most vulnerable yet least prepared countries) are not addressed.

This approach tied directly into the Global South’s finance debate. Ahead of COP27, developing countries had been campaigning hard for a dedicated L&D fund, arguing they face billions in disaster losses for which they are not at fault. The DRC’s strategy leveraged that narrative: it underscored that paying to preserve the Congo’s forests (and thus avoid future floods, droughts or food insecurity) is far cheaper than bearing those losses later. In fact, analysts estimate that climate losses for vulnerable nations could reach hundreds of billions annually. By putting loss and damage on the agenda (which COP27 ultimately did by establishing a new fund), DRC joined other Global South leaders in shifting the conversation toward reparative finance rather than just carbon cuts.

Ethical Dimensions: Climate Justice Considerations

Using environmental assets as leverage is ethically contentious. From a climate-justice standpoint, DRC leaders argue their tactic is justified: it’s a way of demanding the “substantial compensation” owed by rich countries that caused the problem. President Tshisekedi and colleagues have reminded the world that the Congo basin is a global asset and that DRC is a “solution country” for climate – and therefore deserves financial support to keep its forests intact. Gabon’s environment minister captured the sentiment, calling it “galling” for major polluters to lecture African nations against exploiting oil when they themselves refuse to deliver promised climate funds.

Critics counter that treating forests as bargaining chips risks instrumentalizing nature and could set a dangerous precedent. It raises questions about whether it is right to threaten environmental harm (even implicitly) in order to secure money. In practice, however, DRC officials insisted they would not actually drill if it truly endangered ecosystems – the auction was intended as leverage, not policy. In climate-justice terms, this reflects a raw reality: countries least responsible for historic emissions are effectively “auctioning” future emissions because they see no alternative path to urgent financing. Many observers note that this underscores the injustice: poorer nations should not have to stake their remaining forests to extract aid. Yet given broken promises from the North, DRC’s leadership chose a provocative stance. In summary, the DRC’s strategy aligns with equity-based arguments (demanding payment for keeping global commons intact) but simultaneously ignites debate over the morality of using possible ecological damage as a bargaining chip.