ACCESS4ALL Group

Over the past decade, climate governance has shifted from a fragmented environmental concern to a central development and macroeconomic priority. Zambia’s experience reflects this broader Global South trajectory, moving from ad hoc responses toward a legally anchored and integrated climate governance framework. However, despite increasingly sophisticated policy architecture, the gap between formal commitments and tangible climate resilience outcomes remains wide. This raises critical questions about whether existing national and international climate frameworks are adequate in scale, speed, and implementation capacity to address the accelerating climate crisis.

Among national frameworks, Zambia’s Green Economy and Climate Change Act No. 18 of 2024 represents the most consequential policy instrument to date. Its effectiveness lies not merely in its ambition but in the institutional authority it creates. By providing a statutory basis for domesticating obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, the Act transforms climate action from a discretionary policy choice into a binding governance responsibility.

Several factors account for its relative effectiveness. High level political commitment has been institutionalised through the establishment of a Council of Ministers chaired by the Vice President, addressing long standing coordination failures across sectors. Climate priorities have been integrated into the Eighth National Development Plan and Vision 2030, signalling a decisive shift away from treating climate change as a standalone environmental issue. Strategic partnerships with international actors, including significant European Union grant support and technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank, have provided the financial and technical impetus required to initiate large scale green growth interventions.

At the international level, the Paris Agreement remains the most influential global climate framework. Its effectiveness lies in near universal participation and the political legitimacy it confers on climate action within national policy systems. For countries such as Zambia, the Paris Agreement functions as both a normative reference point and a strategic instrument for integrating climate objectives into national development planning. However, its reliance on voluntary nationally determined contributions limits its capacity to enforce ambition or accelerate implementation.

In contrast, Zambia’s National Policy on Climate Change of 2016 illustrates how strong policy intent can fail to translate into meaningful outcomes in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. While the policy articulated clear mitigation and adaptation priorities, it lacked regulatory authority and institutional accountability. Climate responsibilities remained fragmented across ministries, with limited incentives or sanctions to ensure compliance.

Implementation barriers were largely structural rather than conceptual. Sub national capacity constraints remain severe, particularly at district level where technical expertise, climate data, and fiscal autonomy are limited. Financial constraints further undermine implementation. The estimated cost of implementing Zambia’s third nationally determined contribution stands at approximately seventeen point two billion United States dollars, representing around sixty five percent of national gross domestic product. Policy incoherence has also weakened effectiveness, as seen in conflicting legislation such as the Cotton Act which mandates the burning of crop residues, directly contradicting climate smart agriculture principles that promote residue retention for soil health. Social dynamics have further constrained outcomes, with widespread dis adoption of conservation agriculture practices once external incentives and subsidies were withdrawn.

Internationally, similar patterns are evident. Many Global South countries possess ambitious climate policies on paper but lack the institutional depth and financial capacity to translate commitments into action. This reinforces concerns that current frameworks prioritise policy formulation over delivery.

While international frameworks such as the Paris Agreement are essential, they remain insufficient to meet global climate goals. The most significant limitation is the financing gap. Adaptation receives only a small proportion of global climate finance despite being the primary priority for most vulnerable countries. This imbalance is compounded by the difficulty Global South countries face in accessing multilateral climate funds, which often involve complex accreditation processes and onerous reporting requirements. As a result, implementation is frequently mediated through international organisations, weakening national ownership and slowing response time.

Political, economic, and social factors play a decisive role in shaping climate policy outcomes. Zambia’s economic dependence on copper mining and rain fed agriculture renders the economy highly vulnerable to both climate variability and global price shocks. Social vulnerability further constrains policy effectiveness, with climate impacts disproportionately affecting women and rural communities, as evidenced by displacement patterns during the 2024 drought. Limited literacy levels and restricted access to climate information reduce the uptake of technically complex interventions.

At the same time, political stability has been a relative strength. Sustained governance continuity provides the long term policy consistency required for green growth investments, highlighting the importance of political conditions alongside policy design.

Although drawn from a different context, Bangladesh’s climate policy experience offers relevant lessons for other Global South countries. Bangladesh has prioritised domestic ownership of adaptation by establishing nationally managed climate funds and embedding climate resilience into core development sectors such as infrastructure, water management, and disaster risk reduction. The central lesson is that climate effectiveness improves when adaptation is treated as a permanent development function rather than a donor driven project cycle.

For other Global South countries, the transferable insight is clear. Climate action gains traction when it is mainstreamed into public finance systems, planning ministries, and local government mandates rather than confined to environment ministries.

Bridging the policy action gap requires structural reform rather than additional policy statements. Zambia’s 2024 Act creates an entry point through the establishment of integrated monitoring, reporting, and verification systems capable of tracking emissions, financial flows, and outcomes in real time. Linking climate action to economic resilience through productive use of renewable energy is equally critical, ensuring that mitigation and adaptation generate tangible livelihood benefits. The National Green Growth Strategy’s recognition of the climate peace security nexus reflects an emerging understanding that climate stress is also a governance and social cohesion challenge.

Decentralised climate finance remains a critical missing element. Mechanisms that allow local institutions and communities to exercise decision making authority over climate resources are essential if adaptation is to occur at the pace required by escalating climate risks.

In critical reflection, climate frameworks increasingly resemble technically sound blueprints confronting weak delivery systems. Policy design has improved and international commitments have expanded, yet without sustained investment in sub national capacity, financial access, and institutional authority, the urgency of the climate crisis will continue to outpace implementation. Ultimately, the effectiveness of climate frameworks must be judged not by their ambition, but by who is empowered to act, how quickly action occurs, and whether sufficient resources are available to translate policy into resilience.